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THE LAW OF GARNISHMENT IN WEST VIRGINIA
LEo CARurN*

LARGELY

due to a haphazard process of statutory evolution,
the specific steps in the development of which lack coordination,
the law of attachment and garnishment in this state-particularly
the law of garnishment'-has arrived at a degree of complication
that requires extended analysis and careful differentiation in order
to be reasonably sure of conforming to the statutory requirements in
any particular case. In addition to the complications arising from
lack of coordination of the various statutory provisions, resulting in
application of different methods of procedure to different phases of
the remedy, the situation is further confused in some instances by
lack of clarity in specific provisions. It is the object of this discussion to attempt in a general way an analysis of the basic statutory provisions, for purposes of differentiation and comparison,
and to call attention to some of the problems of interpretation that
may arise, but without any attempt to deal with the procedure as
a whole.
Any approach to the subject will involve complications in
analysis and comparison which, for a definite understanding, will
tax the patience of the reader: but it is believed that the discussion
* Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
1The words "garnishment"
and "garnishee"

occur only in the attachment statutes and are not found in the statutes relating to suggestion proceedings after judgment, the corresponding terms in the latter statutes being
"suggestion"
and 11suggestee". However, a garnishment proceeding in attachment and a suggestion proceeding after judgment have the same fundamental features, the garnishee in attachment and the suggestee having an

almost identical status in their respective proceedings. Consequently, the
terms "garnishment"
and "garnishee" will be used in this discussion, in
accord with the usage in many of the decisions, as applying to either an
attachment or a suggestion proceeding, as the occasion may require.
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may perhaps be most intelligibly undertaken by adopting a sequence
based on the historical development and chronological order of enactment of the provisions involved. Roughly in accord with such
an approach, the discussion will be distributed among the following
topics in the following order: (1) Persons and Things Subject to
Garnishment. (2) Garnishment in Attachment Proceedings. (3)
General Procedure for Garnishment in a Suggestion Proceeding.
(4) Garnishment of Salaries and Wages of Private Employees in
a Suggestion Proceeding. (5) Garnishment of Salaries, Wages and
Money Due from Public Sources in a Suggestion Proceeding. (6)
Garnishment of Funds in the Hands of Public Officers and in Custody of the Law. (7) Conclusion.
PERSONS AND THINGS SUBJECT TO GARNISHMENT.

Prior to Acts of 1935, there was no provision in the statutes
declaring that the state, its agencies, its political subdivisions,
public corporations or public officers could or could not be made
garnishees in attachment or otherwise. However, it had been clearly
understood, for different reasons in different cases, that none of
these entities or persons could be made a garnishee in any garnishment proceeding. The state could not be made a garnishee because
the constitution provided, without qualification, that the state could
not be made a party defendant in any court of law or equity.2
Public policy, as understood by the Supreme Court of Appeals,
prevented a public corporation or a public officer from being made
a garnishee, even with the consent of the corporation or officer. 8
This principle had been carried so far as to prevent the treasurer
of a municipality from being made a garnishee, even after he had
been ordered to pay the funds in his custody to the defendant in
an attachment proceeding.4 An apparent exception may be noted
in the case of a special commissioner of a court, who may be made
a garnishee with reference to funds which he has been ordered to
disburse.5 However, such a case may be distinguished from the
cases based on public policy. The reason why funds in the custody
of a court cannot be garnisheed is not because public policy is
opposed thereto, but because such a practice would interfere with
2 W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 35.
S Welch Lumber Co. v. Carter Bros., 78 W. Va. 11, 88 S. E. 1034 (1916):
Leiter v. American LaFrance Fire Engine Co., 86 W. Va. 599, 104 S. E. 56

(1920).

4 Ibid.
5 Boylan v. Hines, 62 W. Va. 486, 59 S. E. 503 (1907), distinguished in
Leiter v. American LaFrance Fire Engine Co., 86 W. Va. 599, 104 S. E. 56

(1920).
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the jurisdiction of the court. When a court has ordered its officer
to disburse the funds, it has relinquished its jurisdiction over
them, at least to the extent of permitting them to be the subject
of garnishment.6
Obviously, it is within the power of the legislature to modify
any rule based merely on public policy, and also to provide for
garnishment of funds within the custody of the law, at least to the
extent that there is no interference with the jurisdiction of a court;
but an amendment to the constitution was considered necessary to
permit the state and its agencies to be made garnishees.
The first legislative attack on the public policy rule came in
1935,7 in the following enactment:
"All officers, clerks, school teachers and employees, of any
city, town or county who hold their office by virtue of authority of the legislature, or by virtue of authority from the
governor of the state of West Virginia, or by virtue of authority from any city, town, board of education or county, whether
by election or by appointment, and who receive compensation
for their services from the moneys of such city, town or county
shall, for the purposes of attachment, suggestion, garnishment
and execution, be deemed to be, and are officers, clerks or employees of such city, town or county, and their wages or salaries
shall be subject to attachment, suggestion, garnishment or
execution upon any judgment rendered against them, unless
otherwise exempt."
It will be noted that this enactment, in order to evade any
question of constitutionality, carefully avoids inclusion of any employee of the state or its agencies. As to other publie employees, it
is clearly intended to cover garnishment, not only in suggestion
proceedings after judgment, but also in attachment proceedings
before judgment. It in no way undertakes to modify the rule that
funds in the custody of a court are exempt from garnishment, and
it is definitely confined to garnishment of wages and salaries. Hence
it does not abrogate the rule of public policy when the subject of
garnishment would be a commercial debt or any claim other than
one for wages or salary, or tangible personal property, whoever
might be the custodian.
At this same session of the legislature, a constitutional amendment was submitted,' and later adopted, permitting the state, its
aIbid.
7W. Va. Acts 1935, c. 110.
8Id. at e. 23.
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subdivisions, etc., to be made garnishees or suggestees in a garnishment proceeding. It reads as follows:
"The state of West Virginia shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity, except that the state
of West Virginia, including any subdivision thereof, or any
municipality therein, or any officer, agent or employee thereof,
may be made a defendant in any garnishment or attachment
proceeding, as garnishee or suggestee."
It will be noted that this amendment clearly authorizes the
state and its subsidiaries to be made garnishees, both in attachment
proceedings, which must be before judgment, and in suggestion
proceedings after judgment. However, since the provisions of the
amendment are not self-executing,9 the present scope of its application depends upon the enabling legislation hereinafter discussed.
By Acts of 1939,10 two articles were added to chapter 38 of
the Code. Article 5A n1 relates exclusively to garnishment of salaries
and wages of private employees in suggestion proceedings after
judgment. Except for placing limitations on the amount of salary
and wages which may be the subject of garnishment, its provisions
are procedural in character and have not changed prior rules relating to the parties and res in a garnishment proceeding. There
is nothing in it which would prohibit the garnishment of salaries
or wages of private employees in an attachment proceeding, and
9 State v. Bouchelle, 119 W. Va. 154, 192 S. E. 169 (1937). The garnishee
in this case was a state agency in a suggestion proceeding. The arguments of
counsel and the reasons assigned by the court against the propriety of the
proceeding without enabling legislation apply preeminently to its use against
the state or a state agency. Without attempting to review all the difficulties in
the way of an attempt to adapt the proceeding to the provisions of existing
statutes, the court refers to two obstacles particularly as sufficient to dispose
of the case: (1) No provision has been made in the statutes for service of
process upon the state. (2) The procedure prescribed in article 5, chapter 38
of the Code is not adaptable to a proceeding against the state as a suggestee.
For instance, the provision in that article for rendering judgment against the
suggestee could not be applicable to the state. And these objections, of course,
would apply equally to the state as a garnishee in an attachment proceeding
under article 7, chapter 38 of the Code. However, the same objections would
not apply to a political subdivision as defined in sec. 1, art. 5B, c. 38 of the
Code, note 14 infra. Long existing statutes have provided for service of process
upon political subdivisions and they are not immune from judgments. Wherefore it may be held that the constitutional amendment is sufficiently imllemented by the provisions in articles 5 and 7, chapter 38 of the Code, to
permit a garnishment proceeding under the procedures therein prescribed
against a political subdivision in either an attachment or a garnishment proceeding, as must have been contemplated under W. Va. Acts 1935, c. 110,
=pra n. 7, since no specific procedure was provided for carrying that enactment into effect.
10 W. Va. Acts 1935, c. 66 and c. 67.
11W. Va. Acts 1939, c. 67; W. VA. CoD (Michie Supp. 1939) c. 38, art. 5A.
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apparently this remedy is still available under article 7, chapter
38 of the Code. Article 5B" was enacted for the purpose of carrying into effect the constitutional amendment, and expressly repeals
chapter 110, Acts of 1935, quoted above.
Unlike article 5A, article 5B is not confined to salaries and
wages, but applies to "any money due or to become due... to the
judgment debtor from the state, a state agency, or any political
subdivision of the state", 13 although most of its provisions are
peculiarly applicable to wages and salaries. The term "political
subdivision" is so defined1 4 as to include the public agencies (not
state agencies) which are necessarily contemplated as garnishees
in chapter 110, Acts of 1935, repealed.' 5 Like article 5A, article 5B,
with the exception of section 15 discussed later (which relates to
money or personal property in the hands of a public officer or in
custody of the law, as distinguished from money due or to become
due from the state, a state agency or a political subdivision of the
state), is confined to garnishment in a suggestion proceeding after
judgment and does not include garnishment in an attachment proceeding. Wherefore, since no provision has been made elsewhere,
as might have been made under the constitutional amendment, for
proceeding against the state or any of its agencies as a garnishee in
an attachment proceeding, the state and its agencies under the
present statutes are subject to garnishment only in a suggestion
proceeding. Although chapter 110, Acts of 1935, permitting
garnishment in attachment against the salary and wages of an employee of a political subdivision, has been repealed, the constitutional amendment itself authorizes such a proceeding. Whether
such a proceeding is now possible under the constitutional amendment depends upon whether, the amendment as a whole not being
self-executing, the procedure prescribed by article 7, chapter 38 of
the Code, relating to attachments, is adaptable under any circumstances to garnishment against a political subdivision, a possibility
22W. Va. Acts 1939, c. 66; W. VA. CODE (Michie Supp. 1939) c. 38, art 5B.
13

Section 2.

14"The term 'political subdivision' shall mean any county, county board
of education, municipal corporation, or any other public corporation or governmental unit organized to perform one or more of the functions of local

government or to effect a local improvement." W. VA. CoDE (Aichie Supp.
1939) c. 38, art. 5B, § 1.
When the term "political subdivision" is used in this discussion it will be
understood to have the meaning as defined above.
15 If such was the sole reason of the repeal, the repeal may have been made
without realization of the fact that the repealed statute was broader in its
operation than article 5B, permitting garnishment of salaries and wages in an
attachment proceeding as well as in a suggestion proceeding.
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which must have been contemplated under Acts of 1935, since no
procedure was prescribed to carry its provisions into effect.
No provision has ever been made in any statute for a garnishment proceeding against tangible personal property in the custody
of the state, its agency or a political subdivision, although the terms
of the constitutional amendment are broad enough to authorize
such a proceeding, and, even in the absence of the amendment, the
legislature, under its power to declare public policy, might have
prescribed such a proceeding against a political subdivision when
to do so would not have had the effect of making the state a party
defendant to an action or suit.
It remains to note under the present topic the provisions of
section 15 of article 5B mentioned above, which reads as follows:
"Aloney and other personal property in the hands of a
sheriff, constable, clerk of court, justice of the peace or other
public officer who shall hold the same by virtue of his office
and which belongs or is owed to any person shall be subject to
garnishment and suggestion in the same manner and to the
same extent as if held by him as a private individual, except
that money or other property which is in custodia legis shall
be paid or delivered into the court to abide the result of the
suit, unless the court shall otherwise direct. This section does
not apply to public property or funds."
The words "garnishment and suggestion" in this section
would seem to indicate that, unlike article 5A and the other provisions of article 5B, it is not confined to garnishment in a suggestion proceeding after judgment, but also applies to garnishment
in an attachment proceeding. If so, any public officer custodian
coming within the terms of the section may be subject to garnishment
in an attachment proceeding, although the public agency which he
represents is exempt therefrom. In conclusion, it may be said that
Acts of 1939 add nothing to the possibilities of garnishment in an
attachment proceeding except as provided in section 15 of article
5B; and that article 5B, by repealing chapter 110, Acts of 1939,
eliminated the only prior statute authorizing garnishment in attachment against a public agency.
PROCEDURE IN GARNISHMENT.

In order to determine the proper procedure to pursue in a
garnishment proceeding, it may, depending upon the nature of the
garnishment, be necessary to differentiate and rely upon one or
more of four different articles in the Code, exclusive of the pro-
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visions in chapter 50 relating to attachment and garnishment in
cases before a justice of the peace. The following topics will deal
primarily with a comparison of the procedures prescribed by the
various articles. Provisions not relevant for purposes of comparison
will be ignored.
Garnishment in Attachment Proceedings.
The procedure for garnishment in attachment proceedings in
courts of record is prescribed in article 7, chapter 38 of the Code.' 6
The venue of the garnishment proceeding is, of course, the same
as the venue of the attachment proceeding and the main action or
suit, since it would not, prior to judgment, be practicable to divorce
the ancillary proceeding from the main proceeding and give it a
different venue, regardless of inconvenience to the garnishee. Jurisdiction of the garnishee is obtained by service on him of a copy of
the attachment order, with an endorsement thereon designating
him as a person indebted or liable to, or having in his possession
the effects of, the defendant. A further endorsement, by the clerk,
requires the garnishee to answer under oath at the next term of
the court in which the action or suit is pending.' Service of the
attachment order so endorsed gives the plaintiff a lien upon debts
and liabilities due from the garnishee to the defendant and upon
personal property of the defendant in the possession or under the
control of the garnishee.' 8 Thereafter, the garnishee is essentially
a party to the litigation.
The garnishee has the privilege of paying money due the defendant, or of delivering property belonging to the defendant, to
the officer having the attachment order, but only if he does so before the return day of the order. If he avails himself of the
privilege, he is thereafter discharged from further liability under
the attachment and from all liability to the defendant. 9 In the
absence of such payment or delivery to the officer, the garnishee's
liability and the disposition which he is required to make of money
or property are determined by a court order based on his answer,
if not contested by the plaintiff, or, in default of an answer, on
proof offered by the plaintiff. 20 The statute,:" which is not entirely
16 Sections 15, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29.
1 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931)
c. 38, art. 7, § 15.
18 Id. at c. 38, art. 7, § 19.
19 Id. at c. 38, art. 7, § 25.
21o
Id. at c. 38, art. 7, §§ 26 and 27.

This section, as to time, fixes the liability of
21 Id. at c. 38, art 7, § 26.
the garnishee as it appears from his answer "Iat or after the service of the
attachment."

Obviously, some limitation must be put upon future extension

of the time.
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clear in its terms, has been construed as binding the garnishee only
for money owed by him to the defendant, or effects of the defendant
in his custody, at the time of the answer." The plaintiff has a right
to contest the fullness of the garnishee's disclosures in his answer
or of the delivery made to the levying officer, in which event the
garnishee's liability must be determined by a jury, unless by consent of the parties a jury is waived and the matter is submitted to
the court. 23 An order made against the garnishee has the effect of
a judgment and may be enforced in the same manner as any other
judgment, 4 which means, of course, that normally it will be enforced by execution.
Gene-ratProcedurefor Garnishment in a Suggestion Proceeding.
The general procedure prescribed for garnishment in a suggestion proceeding in article 5, chapter 38 of the Code,2 ' is largely
the same as that prescribed for garnishment in an attachment proceeding, the analogy between the two being very close. Both are
ancillary remedies. The garnishmenf in attachment is in aid of
the attachment, which in turn is in aid of the main suit or action.
The suggestion proceeding is in aid of an execution, which in turn
is in aid of the fruits of the main action, a judgment. The essential
differences between the two proceedings arise primarily from the
fact that one comes before judgment and the other after judgment.
The function of the suggestion proceeding is enforcement of
The execution, and not the suggestion proceedan execution lien.
ing, creates the lien. When the execution is issued, it establishes
a lien on all the execution debtor's personal property, whether in
his own possession or in the possession of a third party, although
a third party is not subject to the consequences of the lien until he
has notice, by service of the suggestee process or otherwise," of the
existence of the execution. Hence the purpose of the suggestion proceeding is not to create a lien, but to give the suggestee notice of
an execution lien already existing, bind him to its consequences,
and furnish the execution creditor with a mechanism to accomplish
satisfaction of the lien.' s Wherefore, of course, issuance of an
20Ringold v. Suter, 35 W. Va. 186, 13 S. E. 46 (1891).
23 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931)

c. 38, art. 7,

§

28.

24 Id. at c. 38, art. 7, § 29.

25 Sections 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19.
28 Park v. McCauley, 67 W. Va. 104, 67 S. B. 174 (1910); Exchange Bank
of Mannington v. Beatty, 107 W. Va. 129, 147 S. E. 475 (1929).

27Ibid.
2 Ibid.
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execution is necessarily a prerequisite to institution of the suggestion proceeding.
Like a garnishee in an attachment proceeding, the suggestee
essentially becomes a party to the litigation, here entirely ancillary,
since the main controversy has terminated; but, as an important
consequence of the fact that the suggestion proceeding is instituted
after judgment in the main action or suit, it is not necessary, as
in the case of garnishment in attachment, that the proceeding be
conducted in the same county in which the action or suit was pending. Consequently, the statute provides, presumably for the convenience of the suggestee,- that the proceeding shall be instituted
in the county in which the suggestee resides; or, if he be a non30
resident of the state, in the county in which he may be found.
The fact that no specific provision is made as to venue in the case
of corporate suggestees has given rise to some complication in application of the statute to corporations, making it necessary to define the status of corporations in terms of residence. In Exchange
Bank of Manuington v. Beatty,3 ' it was decided that a suggestion
proceeding against a resident domestic corporation as suggestee
must be instituted in the county of the corporation's residence,
which is the county in which it has its principal office; although
a suggestion proceeding against a nonresident domestic corporation
as suggestee may be instituted in any county in which the execution debtor might sue the corporation for recovery of the money
due or property held.
The first step in starting the proceeding is to file the suggestion
and an attested copy of the writ of fieri facias with the clerk of
the circuit court of the county in which the proceeding is instituted.32 The suggestion filed with the clerk serves the same purpose as the endorsement on the attachment order designating the
garnishee in attachment. The next step is the issuance of the suggestee process by the clerk. It is conceivable that, by analogy to
the attachment procedure, a copy of the execution with an endorsement thereon might have been made to serve the function of
process against the suggestee. However, in lieu thereof, the statute
requires that a summons shall be served upon the suggestee requiring him to answer at the next term of court under oath as to
Z Exchange bank of Mannington v. Beatty, 107 W. Va. 129, 147 S. E. 475
(1929).
8o W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 38, art. 5, § 10.

81 Note 26, supra.

82W. VA. REv.

CODE

(1931) c. 38, art. 5, § 10.
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the matter stated in the suggestion. 33 No provision is made for any
notice to the execution debtor of pendency of the proceeding.
As in the attachment garnishment proceeding, 8 the garnishee
is given the privilege of delivering the property or paying the
money for which he is liable at any time before the return day of
the summons, after doing which he is discharged from all liability
under the execution or to the judgment debtor.88 The section extending this privilege, unlike the attachment section, which requires payment or delivery to the officer having the attachment
writ, does not indicate expressly to whom the delivery or payment
shall be made. However, this and a following section," by implication, indicate that the delivery or payment is to be made to the
officer serving the summons. As in the case of the attachment procedure, the prospective time for which the suggestee is bound is
limited to the time of filing the answer; but in the suggestion pro.
ceeding the time is still further limited to the return day of the
execution, if it comes before the filing of the answer.8 7 As in the
case of an order against a garnishee in attachment, an order against
a suggestee has the effect of a judgment and may be enforced in
the same manner as any other judgment 88
Other details of the procedure in the suggestion proceeding
are substantially the same as those in a garnishment proceeding in
attachment discussed in the prior topic.
Garnishment of Salaries and Wages of Private Employees
in a Suggestion Proceeding.
Article 5A, chapter 38 of the Code, enacted in 1939,39 is restricted exclusively to garnishment of salaries and wages of private
employees, and no provision is made therein even for the garnishment of salaries and wages except in a suggestion proceeding after
judgment. Hence this article does not cover garnishment of
salaries or wages in an attachment proceeding, where the remedy
is still governed by the provisions of article 7, chapter 38 of the
Code. But for the garnishment of salaries and wages in a suggestion proceeding, it provides the exclusive remedy.4
33Tbid.

a4 W. VA. REv. CoDE (1931) c. 38, art. 7, § 25.
85 Id. at c. 38, art. 5, § 14.

86 Id. at e. 38, art. 5, §j18.
37 Id. at C. 38, art. 5, § 15.
38 Id. at c. 38, art. 5, § 16.
3GW. Va. Acts 1939, c. 67; W. VA. CODE (Michie Supp. 1939) c. 38, art. 5A.

40 ,Salary and wages payable to any person engaged in private employment, whether due and owing or to become due and owing shall be subject to
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Unlike prior statutes, this article places a limitation on salaries
and wages which may be the subject of garnishment. A uniform
exemption of ten dollars per week is prescribed. If the amount of
salary or wages exceeds ten dollars per week, then twenty per cent
thereof is subject to garnishment, with the limitation that ten dollars per week must always remain exempt.41
As under article 5, chapter 38 of the Code, covering garnishment in general on a suggestion after judgment, discussed in the
preceding topic, so under the present article issuance of an execution is prerequisite to institution of the suggestion proceeding; but
the present article prescribes, as a further prerequisite, that the
execution must have been returned wholly or partly unsatisfied,4 2
presumably in order to vouch for the necessity of the suggestion
proceeding and avoid annoyance to a suggestee and embarrassment
to the judgment debtor in cases where the judgment might be satisfied by direct action against the judgment debtor. The suggestee
is not served with a summons, as under article 5, but with a second
execution, called a "suggestee execution", 4 the form of which is
to be prescribed by the Supreme Court of Appeals.44
Although the section 43 describing the lien to be enforced by
the suggestion proceeding is not as clear as it might be, owing to
the fact that the execution creating the lien is referred to without
indicating precisely whether it is the original or the suggestee execution, it seems fairly definite from this and other sections of the
article that the lien of the original execution does not, as under
article 5, cover salary and wages due from the suggestee; but
that the lien enforced under article 5A has its inception upon
service of the suggestee execution upon the suggestee, relating, after
service, to the time of issuance of the suggestee execution.* This
being true, service of the suggestee execution does not, as does
service of the summons under article 5, merely give the suggestee
notice of a prior existing lien created by the original execution, but
itself creates the lien and at the same time gives the suggestee nosuggestion by judgment creditors only as provided by this article." W VA.
CoDE (Mfichie Supp. 1939) c. 38, art. 5A, § 2.
41 Id. at c. 38, art. 5A, § 3.
42 Ibid.

43 Tid. "The term 'suggestee execution' shall mean an execution differing
from an ordinary execution upon a judgment only in that it is directed against
money due or to become due to the judgment debtor from the suggestee as therein set out."
44W. VA. CODE ( ifehie Supp. 1939) c. 38, art. 5A, § 11. The form has
been prescribed by the Supreme Court of Appeals in volume 121 of the Supreme
Court Reports.
45W. VA. CODE (Mihie Supp. 1939) c. 38, art. 5A, § 3.
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tice thereof. Hence it seems that the suggestee will not, as under
article 5, be bound in any way by mere notice, from whatever
source, of issuance of the original execution, but that his liability
begins with service of the suggestee process.
In the matter of venue, the present article does not seem to
show the same solicitude for convenience of the suggestee as does
article 5. While article 5 provides that the suggestion proceeding
shall be in the county of the suggestee's residence, the present
article provides that it may be in "the court in which the judgment
was recovered or in a court having jurisdiction of the same."" It
would seem that the phrase "a court having jurisdiction of the
same" may call for construction. Grammatically, the word "same"
would seem to refer to "judgment", and such may be accepted as
the most plausible construction; but to speak of a court's having
"jurisdiction of a judgment" is to indulge in a nontechnical and
indefinite, if not anomalous, expression. "Jurisdiction of a
judgment", in the abstract, without reference to action which the
jurisdiction involves, is meaningless. A court may have jurisdiction
to entertain an action or suit based upon a judgment; jurisdiction
to issue a scire facias to revive it; jurisdiction to issue an execution upon it; or jurisdiction to do other things with reference to
it; and no single court may at any time have jurisdiction to do
all these things. If the statute is intended to mean jurisdiction to
do some specific thing, and not all things, e. g., jurisdiction to issue
an execution, why does it not say so ? Ungrammatically, the word
"same" might be understood as referring to "execution", but
such a construction would involve the same objection of indefiniteness as if it referred to "judgment". It hardly could refer to
application for the suggestee execution. Jurisdiction to issue the
suggestee execution is the very thing which the statute is undertaking to define. The common law cannot fix the venue, because
there is no such proceeding at common law. Whether by reason
of construction placed upon the statute, or in order to avoid problems of construction, perhaps in most if not all cases the proceeding
will be instituted in the court which rendered the judgment. Perhaps such a result was the normal consequence contemplated by
the legislature, since the procedure under the present article, as
46 Ibid. "Upon the return of an execution wholly or partly unsatisfied a
judgment creditor may apply to the court in which the judgment was recovered
or a court having jurisdiction of the same, without notice to the judgment
debtor, for a suggestee execution against any money due or to become due
within one year after the issuance of such execution to the judgment debtor
as salary or wages arising out of any private employment."
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hereinafter appears, seems to have been designed so as not to subject
the suggestee to any controversy within the suggestion proceeding
and so compel him to go beyond the county of his residence to engage in litigation.
In lieu of the suggestion of indebtedness of the suggestee to
the judgment debtor which the execution creditor is required to
make under article 5,'7 the present article provides that he "may
apply . . . for a suggestee execution", which shall be issued "If
satisfactory proof shall be made, by affidavit or otherwise", that
the original execution has been returned wholly or partly unsatisfied, and that the amount of salary or wages exceeds ten dollars
per week. 48 No provision is made as to the form of the application,
e. g., whether it may be oral or must be in writing.
No notice to the judgment debtor of the application for the
suggestee execution is necessary, 49 but a copy of the suggestee
execution must be served upon him five days before it is served
upon the suggestee, 50 presumably for the same reason that the original execution is required to be returned wholly or party unsatisfied-to give the judgment debtor an opportunity to satisfy the
judgment before proceeding against the suggestee. Service of the
copy of the suggestee execution upon the judgment debtor may be
by registered mail, 51 but it "shall be served upon the suggestee in
the same manner as a summons commencing an action is served."
In contrast to the suggestee's liability under article 5, which
makes him liable only for the amount due at the time of filing his
answer or at the return day of the execution, whichever comes
first, 3 under the present article, upon service of the suggestee
execution upon the suggestee, "the execution and the expenses
thereof shall become a lien and continuing levy upon the salary
or wages due or to become due to the judgment debtor within one
year after the issuance of the same, unless sooner vacated or modified"." Provision is made for vacation or modification of the
suggestee execution,", and also for renewal of an execution which
47
48

W.
W.

VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 38, art. 5, § 10.
VA. CODE (Michie Supp. 1939) c. 38, art. 5A,

49 lrbi.
o Id. at c.

§

3.

38, art. 5A, § 4.

51 bid

52Id. at c. 38, art. 5A, § 5.

W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 38, art. 5, § 15.
W. VA. CODe (Michie Supp. 1939) e. 38, art. 5A, § 3.
55 Id. at c. 38, art. 5A, § 6.
63

6
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shall expire wholly or partly unsatisfied.rG The renewal covers a
period of time similar to that of the original. It retains "the same
priority of lien as the original if, and only if, served within thirty
days before the expiration of the life of the original".
Unlike the procedure under article 5, where the suggestee is
primarily responsive to the court with the privilege of payment or
delivery to the officer, under the present article the suggestee is responsive to the officer making the levy or to the judgment creditor,
to either of whom he may make payment.5 7 No provision is made
for filing an answer, as under article 5, or for the suggestee's indicating in any other way the amount for which he is liable. Consequently, of course there is no provision, as in article 5, for a
contest of the fullness of the suggestee's disclosures, nor is provision
made for the entry of any order fixing the amount of the suggestee's liability. In lieu of such an order, which under article five
has the force of a judgment, the judgment creditor is given a right
of action against a suggestee who "shall fail or refuse to pay over
to the officer serving the execution or to the judgment creditor the
required percentage of the indebtedness "." No provision is made
for a contest within the suggestion proceeding as to the amount
of the salary or wages earned by the judgment debtor, as to whether
the portion of salary or wages subject to suggestee executions has
already been exhausted by prior levies, or as to other matters upon
which the suggestee might rely as excusing or qualifying payment
by him of the claimed percentage of salary or wages, except the
provision for vacating or modifying the suggestee execution hereinbefore noted. 9 In fact, the general scheme of the procedure seems
to have been designed with the object of avoiding giving the suggestee the status of a litigant in the suggestion proceeding, a status
which he has under article 5, chapter 38 of the Code.
Garnishment of Salaries, Wages and Money Due from Public
Sources in a Suggestion 'Proceeding.
Salaries and wages of private employees were subject to
garnishment under the general provisions of article 5, chapter 38
50 Id. at c. 38, art. 5A, § 7. The long life given to the lien under these provisions relieves the judgment creditor from the inconvenience of resorting to
successive executions, as under article 5. On the other hand, the judgment
creditor is compensated by the fact that, as heretofore noted, at the most only
one-fifth of his salary or wages is subject to the lien, making it possible to
take from him only in a period of five months an amount which might have
been taken from him at one time under article 5.
57 W. VA. CODE (Michie Supp. 1939) c. 38, art. 5A, § 5.
s Ibid.
0 See note 55, supra.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol48/iss1/2

14

Carlin: The Law of Garnishment in West Virginia

WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

15

of the Code. Hence, presumably, the procedure embodied in article
5A, discussed in the prior topic, was substituted for the procedure
embodied in article 5, so far as it covers salaries and wages, either in
order to prescribe what the legislature considered a better procedure
for garnishment of salaries and wages, or in order to achieve uniformity in the garnishment of salaries and wages in suggestion proceedings as to all employees, whether public or private; or, possibly, for both reasons. But article 5B, the subject of the present
topic, was enacted for the purpose of carrying into effect the constitutional amendment and, to the extent that it provides for garnishment of the state and its agencies, creates an entirely new field of
garnishment in a suggestion proceeding.
Eliminating provisions dictated by the peculiar status of public
employees and garnishees, consideration of which is not necessary
for purposes of comparison, it may be said that the general provisions of articles 5A and 5B, prescribing the mechanisms for
garnishment of salaries and wages of private and public employees,
respectively, are largely similar in character, phraseology and effect.
With the exceptions noted below, the provisions heretofore noted as
applying to salaries and wages of private employees under article
5A apply with substantially equal effect to salaries and wages of
public employees under article 5B. However, there would seem to
be enough dissimilarity, some of it apparently unnecessary, in the
phraseology, sequence, arrangement, and even the substance, of
the provision of the two articles to militate against uniformity, and
to cause some confusion in their application unless each article is
considered strictly in isolation as applying to its peculiar subject
matter.
It will be noted that article 5B, like article 5A, with the
exception of section 15 hereinafter discussed, is restricted to garnishment in a suggestion proceeding after judgment and makes no
provision for garnishment in an attachment proceeding before
judgment. In other words, only where the garnishee is a public
officer as defiued in section 15, as distinguished from the state, its
agency or a political subdivision, is provision made for garnishment in an attachment proceeding. However, article 5B, unlike
article 5A, is not confined to garnishment of salaries and wages,
but covers "any money due or to become due within one year"
after issuance of the suggestee execution, which of course includes
salaries and wages. 60
60 W. VA. CODE (fichie

Supp. 1939) c. 38, art. 5B, § 2.
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When more than one suggestee execution is pending against
the salary or wages of a private employee, article 5A' provides that
they shall be satisfied in the order of their priority. There is no
provision in that article specifically fixing the order of priority.
The statute provides that the suggestee execution, after service,
"shall become a lien and continuing levy upon the salary and wages
due or to become due to the judgment debtor within one year after
the issuance of the same"62 Apparently, the lien comes into existence upon service of the suggestee execution, but relates back to
the time of its issuance, and the order of priority between different
executions is intended to be deduced as resulting from the respective times of their issuance. Article 5B, relating to public
employees, contains similar provisions63 as to the inception of the
lien and the time period which it covers and, apparently in aid of
these provisions, a further provision, not found in article 5A, that
the day and hour of the issuance of the suggestee execution shall
be entered on the face thereof.8 4 However, under article 5B suggestee executions are not to be satisfied in the order of their issuance,
but in the order in which they are served upon the suggestee85 The
only way occurring to the writer in which these apparently inconsistent provisions in article 5B may be harmonized is to assume that,
as to liens other than suggestee execution liens the priority of a suggestee execution is to be determined by the time of its issuance, but
that as between different suggestee executions the priority is to
be determined by the time of service on the suggestee. Why some of
these matters should be left to deduction in the one article and are
made specific in the other, and why different rules of priority, if
such is the intention, should be prescribed in the two articles, is
not clear to the writer.
Superimposed upon the provisions noted in the preceding paragraph fixing the inception of the suggestee execution lien, apparently for convenience of the suggestee in the case of public employees,
is a further provision in article 5B, nothing similar to which is
found in article 5A: "Such an execution shall not become a lien
against salary or wages payable by the state or a state agency with01 Id. at c. 38, art. 5A, § 3.
65JJbid.
63 W.

VA. CODE (Miehie Supp. 1939) c. 38, art. 5B, § 2.

64 Ibidg.
Gbid. "Where more than one suggestee execution shall have been issued

pursuant to the provisions of this section against the same judgment debtor,
they shall be satisfied in the order of priority in which they are served upon
the state, state agency or political subdivision from which such money is due
or shall become due."
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in ten days after the service thereof or payable by a political subdivision within five days after the service thereof.'' 86
Under article 5A, relating to private employees, the contents
of the suggestee execution are not specifically prescribed, the form
of the execution being left to regulation by the Supreme Court of
Appeals.17 Under article 5B, relating to public employees, there is
a similar provision authorizing the court to prescribe the form of
the execution.0 8 and, in addition thereto, the following provision:
"A suggestee execution against salary or wages shall contain the
name of the judgment debtor and the bureau, office, department,
institution or subdivision thereof of the state or political subdivision
of the state, as the case may be, of which he is an officer or employee.'"9
Under article 5A, relating to private employees, the suggestee
execution "shall be served upon the suggestee in the same manner
as a summons commencing an action is served. "'70 Under article 5B,
relating to public employees and creditors, if the suggestee is the
state or a state agency, service may be made by mail, 71 but there
is no provision, as there is in the case of service of a copy of the
suggestee execution upon the judgment debtor,72 that the mail
shall be registered mail. If the suggestee is a political subdivision
of the state, "service by mail shall not be sufficient or binding ",7
but no other mode of service is indicated. Does this mean that
service in such a case shall be in the same manner in which a summons commencing an action is served, as under article 5A?
Under article 5A, relating to private employees, the suggestee
is required to make payment to the officer serving the suggestee
execution or to the judgment creditor, 74 and no provision is made
for payment to a court or the clerk thereof. Under article 5B, relating to public employees and creditors, payment is required to be
made "to the court or clerk of the court who issued the execution
or to the officer presenting the same' ,7" and no provision is made
for payment to the judgment creditor, as under article 5A.
VA. CODE (Michie Supp. 1939) c. 38, art. 5B, § 3.
67 See note 44, supra.
68 W. VA. CODE (Michie Supp. 1939) c. 38, art. 5B, § 14.
GOW.

601d. at c. 38, art. 5B, § 3.

70 Id. at c. 38, art. 5A, § 5, note 52, supra.
71 I. at c. 38, art. 5B, § 5.

Id.
Id.
74 Id.
7 Id.
72
73

at c. 38, art. 5A, § 4, and art. 5B, § 4.
at c. 38, art. 5B, § 5.
at e. 38, art. 5A, § 5.
at e. 38, art. 5B, § 9.
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As under article 5A, so under article 5B no provision is made
for fixing the liability of a suggestee or an officer or agent of a suggestee by any proceeding within the suggestion proceeding. A public officer who makes an improper payment, or who fails or refuses
to make a proper payment, is made personally liable, but only in
the event that he acts in bad faith .7 There is no provision as to
how the liability shall be imposed, but presumably it is intended
that the judgment debtor or the judgment creditor, as the case may
be, shall have a right of action by reason thereof against the officer.
The judgment creditor is given a right of action against a political
subdivision which fails or refuses to make proper payment as a
suggestee. 77 No judgment is permitted against the state as a suggestee, "but a judgment creditor may bring an action against the
proper officer for a declaratory judgment establishing" sums payable under the suggestee execution.78 No provision is made as to
how such a judgment shall be enforced -whether it establishes a
personal liability against the officer which may be enforced by
execution, or whether it shall be enforced by mandamus against the
officer as to public funds in his custody.
As under article 5A,7 9 so under article 5B the suggestee execution is subject to the exemptions prescribed in article 8, chapter 38
of the Code. In addition thereto, article 5B prescribes the following
exemptions:
"Money due to any lawful beneficiary thereof from any
workmen's compensation, unemployment compensation, pension or retirement, or public assistance or relief fund or system, shall not be subject to suggestion under this article.
"Public obligations, whether in the form of bonds, notes,
certificates of indebtedness, or otherwise, and whether negotiable or non-negotiable, shall not be subject to suggestion
under this article." 0
There may be other provisions in articles 5A and 5B presenting
problems worthy of discussion, but, as heretofore indicated, the primary object of this discussion is to make a comparison of procedures, and it is believed that the foregoing observations have
called attention to most of the provisions deserving consideration in
this respect.
70 Ibid.
78
7

Ibid.

W. VA.

CODE

(Michie Supp. 1939) e. 38, art. 5A, § 9.

80 Id. at c. 38, art. 5B, § 12.
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Garnislment of Funds in the Hands of Public Officers
and in Custody of the Law.
Provision for garnishment of money and personal property in
the hands of a public officer is made in section 15, article 5B, chapter 38 of the Code. This section, already quoted in the first topic of
this discussion, for convenience is quoted here again.
".Money and other personal property in the hands of a
sheriff, constable, clerk of court, justice of the peace or other
public officer who shall hold the same by virtue of his office
and which belongs or is owed to any person shall be subject to
garnishment and suggestion in the same manner and to the
same extent as if held by him as a private individual, except
that money or other property which is in custodia legis shall be
paid or delivered into the court to abide the result of the suit,
unless the court shall otherwise direct. This section does not
apply to public property or funds."
In the absence of careful differentiation, the effects of the provisions of this section and of the provisions of other sections of the
article in which it occurs may be confused. In other sections of the
article, the state, its agency or a political subdivision of the state,
is the suggestee, and officers are mentioned and dealt with merely
as agents of such suggestees; e. g., as representatives of suggestees
for the purpose of service of process, making payment, etc. But
under the present section, the officer himself is the suggestee.
It will be noted that this section is not restricted to salaries
and wages, as under article 5A, nor to money due or to become due
(including salaries and wages), as under the other sections of article
5B; but covers money owing generally (not money to become due)
and also personal property. Furthermore, as heretofore noted, this
section seems, by virtue of the phrase " garnishment and suggestion"
not only to cover garnishment in a suggestion proceeding after
judgment, but also garnishment in an attachment proceeding.
No method of procedure under this section is prescribed, except the general provision that the money or property "shall be
subject to garnishment and suggestion in the same manner and
to the same extent as if held by him as a private individual". If
there is a possibility, which seems remote, that a public officer
under any circumstances may hold money by virtue of his office
which is owing to a judgment debtor as salary or wages of a private
employee, then in such a case a suggestion proceeding against the

officer would follow the procedure prescribed by article 5A. The
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procedure prescribed by article 5B would not seem to be applicable,
because it all seems to be confined to instances where the state, its
agency or a political subdivision, and not an officer, is the suggestee.
Wherefore, it would seem that in a suggestion proceeding under
the present section the procedure to be followed is that prescribed
in article 5, chapter 38 of the Code, prescribing generally the procedure to be pursued in a suggestion proceeding. If the garnishment is in an attachment proceeding, the procedure of course must
be that prescribed by article 7, chapter 38 of the Code.
The provision in this section relating to "custodia legis" would
seem to call for construction. What is meant by custody of the
law? What court and what suit are those mentioned in the statute?
Is the court the one under whose jurisdiction the garnishment or
suggestion proceeding is pending, or a court of which the garnishee
or suggestee is an officer or agent? In some sense, money or property held by any of the officers enumerated in the section "by virtue
of his office" is in custody of the law. Custody of the law may, but
does not necessarily, mean custody or jurisdiction of a court. However, if the money or property is supposed to be in custody of the
law by virtue of an action or suit pending in the court mentioned
in the statute, as seems probable, then it will be necessary to give
some such restricted meaning to the phrase. Such a construction
should have the virtue of indicating the court into which the money
or property is to be paid or delivered "to abide the result of the
suit". If custody of the law means custody or jurisdiction of a
court through its officer or agent, then it is logical to assume that
the court indicated by the statute is the one whose officer or agent
has custody of the res, and that the provision was inserted in the
statute to prevent encroachment upon its jurisdiction without its
consent, which would only be given by its own order.,,
CONCLUSION.
From the melange of statutory enactments now wholly or
partly in force, the following conclusions may be stated. Prior to
Acts of 1935, except before justices of the peace, the law of garnishment was regulated by only two general enactments- article 7,
chapter 38 of the Code, providing for garnishment in an attachment
proceeding; and article 5, chapter 38, providing for garnishment
81 Possibly this provision, in order to prevent encroachment upon the jurisdiction of a court without its consent, contemplates some such distinction as is
made in Boylan v. Hines, 62 W. Va. 486, 59 S. E. 503 (1907), cited in note 5,

supra.
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in a suggestion proceeding after judgment. Under neither of these
articles was it possible to garnishee the state, its agency, a political
subdivision, a public corporation, or a public officer; or to reach
funds or property under the direct jurisdiction of a court.
By chapter 110, Acts of 1935, repealed by article 5B, chapter
38 of the Code, it was made possible to garnishee, either in an attachment proceeding or in a suggestion proceeding after judgment, the
wages and salaries of public employees other than employees of the
state or its agency. Since no procedure was prescribed in this enactment, the procedure to be pursued was necessarily that prescribed in article 7, chapter 38 of the Code, if the garnishment was
in an attachment proceeding; and the procedure prescribed in
article 5, chapter 38, if the garnishment was in a suggestion proceeding.
In article 5B, chapter 38 of the Code, enacted in 1939 in pursuance of the constitutional amendment, provision is made for garnishment in a suggestion proceeding of any money (including salary
and wages) due or to become due within a limited time to a
judgment debtor from the state, a state agency or a political subdivision of the state, and the procedure therefor is prescribed in
detail; but, as against such a garnishee, no provision is made for
any garnishment whatever in an attachment proceeding, nor for
any garnishment in a suggestion proceeding except as to money
due or to become due. Wherefore, since the constitutional amendment, permitting garnishment against any of these entities, in
either an attachment or a suggestion proceeding, clearly is not selfexecuting and has not been implemented by statute, except as in
article 5B, with reference to the state and its agencies, there is no
possibility of any garnishment proceeding against the state or its
agencies except in a suggestion proceeding for money due or to become due to a judgment debtor as provided in article 5B. As to
garnishment proceedings against a political subdivision, the possibilities may be broader.
Although chapter 110, Acts of 1935, permitting garnishment
proceedings against the wages or salary of an employee of a political
subdivision in either an attachment or a suggestion proceeding, has
been repealed, the constitutional amendment, as noted above,
authorizes such proceedings, not only against salaries and wages
due, but also against any money due from a political subdivision or
personal property in its custody. While no statute has ever been
enacted which will serve the purpose of implementing the con-
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stitutional amendment as to the state and its agencies except article
5B, articles 5 and 7, chapter 38 of the Code noV being adequate for
such a purpose, it may be possible that the procedures prescribed in
articles 5 and 7 will be held sufficient to implement the amendment
for purposes of proceeding in either an attachment or a suggestion
proceeding against a political subdivision as a garnishee, and with
reference to either money or property." However, in weighing
such a possibility, consideration should be given to the fact that, as
to garnishment in a suggestion proceeding against money due or
to become due from a public source, any possible resort to
article 5 may have been superseded by the remedy prescribed in
article 5B, although there is no provision in article 5B, as there is
in article 5A,8 a that an exclusive remedy is prescribed by the
article.
For garnishment of salaries and wages of private employees
in a suggestion proceeding after judgment, article 5A, chapter 38
of the Code prescribes the exclusive procedure ;84 but there is
nothing in this article which prohibits the garnishment of such
salaries and wages in an attachment proceeding under article 7,
chapter 38 of the Code, as has been done before the enactment of
article 5A, and presumably such remedy is still available.
As heretofore noted, section 15, article 5B, chapter 38 of the
Code, relating to the garnishment of money or personal property
in the hands of a public officer in either an attachment or a suggestion proceeding, prescribes no procedure therefor. Since the
procedures prescribed in articles 5A and 5B are applicable only
when a private employer, the state, a state agency or a political
subdivision, and not a public officer, is the garnishee, there seems
to be little possibility that either of these procedures may be employed against a public officer garnishee under the section aforesaid. Wherefore it seems that, under this section, if the garnishment is in an attachment proceeding, the procedure must be as
prescribed in article 7, chapter'38 of the Code; and if the garnishment is in a suggestion proceeding, the procedure must be that
prescribed in article 5, chapter 38.
It has not been the intention to involve in this discussion the
provisions of chapter 50 of the Code, relating to garnishment in
attachments and suggestions on judgments before justices of the
82 See note 9, supra.
83 W. VA. CODD (Michie Supp. 1939) e. 38, art. 5A,

84 Ibid.

§
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peace. It may be noted, however, that the procedure prescribed in
article 5A, chapter 38, for garnishment of salaries and wages
of private employees must be pursued in suggestion proceedings
before justices, because this article prescribes the exclusive procedure for such purposes in whatever court; and that the procedure
prescribed in article 5B likewise must be pursued in suggestion proceedings before justices, at least so far as it applies to money due
from the state or its agencies, because no other procedure has been
provided for carrying into effect the constitutional amendment.
It would seem that something could be done by way of clarifying, harmonizing, and coordinating the various statutes dealing
with the different phases of garnishment in this state. Perhaps the
greatest confusion in administration of the statutes will result from
the fact that different procedures, varying widely in detail, are prescribed for garnishment in suggestion proceedings after judgment.
In most instances, if not all, there is no possibility of electing between the different procedures as applied to any given case. For
example, if the proceeding is against the salary or wages of a private employee, the exclusive procedure is that prescribed in article
5A, chapter 38 of the Code; if the money due from the suggestee
to the judgment debtor represents a mere commercial debt owing in
a private capacity, the procedure must be that provided in article 5,
chapter 38 of the Code; and if the proceeding is against salary,
wages or other money due from the state or its agency, the procedure must be as prescribed in article 5B, chapter 38 of the Code.
Not only may the details of the different procedures be confused in
applying the remedy selected, but selection of the remedy itself may
involve a process of search, comparison and elimination. There
would seem to be no reason why the broader details of the different
procedures should not be more uniform; e. g., provisions relating
to the venue of the proceeding, the nature of the suggestee process,
the nature and inception of the lien, etc. If one procedure is better
than the others, and amalgamation is not expedient, uniformity
may be aided by adopting the basic features of the better procedure
and making the others conform thereto as nearly as practicable.
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